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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RECENT CASE NOTE
PRACTICE-THE SCOPE OF THE ACTION OF TRESPASS
In Pearl Assurance Co. v. The National Insurance Agency, 150 Pa. Super.
265, 28 A. (2d) 334, reheard in 151 Pa. Super., 146, 30 A. (2d) 333 (1943),
it was held that an action of trespass would lie by an insurance company to
recover the amount of premiums on policies received by the defendant as its
agent, even though there was no obligation on the part of the defendant to
pay to the insurance company the identical specie or currency received by him.
As a result of this decision, the scope of the action of trespass in Pennsyl-
vania has been extended. In Life Association v. Catlin, 2 Walker 338, decided
in 1879, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that trover would not lie to
recover the amount of premiums on life insurance policies received by the
defendant as agent for the plaintiff. The Court, speaking through Trunkey,
P. J., said, "The action of trover is only maintainable for specific property; it
will lie for so many pieces of gold or silver, and in that case the defendant
can redeem himself by tendering to the plaintiff the same specific pieces."
Since that decision the problem had not arisen in the appellate courts until
1927, when the Superior Court followed the doctrine of the Catlin case in
Cherry v. Paller, 91 Pa. Super. 417. In that case the court held that neither
trover nor any other form of trespass would lie for an alleged conversion of
money received by the defendant as authorized agent for collection of rents
for his principal, the plaintiff, since the former was under no duty to return
the identical money.
Between the time of the decision in the Catlin case (1879) and the
decision in thL Paller (1927) and the instant case (1943), however, the Acts
of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271 and May 18, 1917, P. L. 241 (repealed but
substantially re-enacted by the Penal Code of 1939, P. L. 872, sec. 834) were
passed. It is upon the interpretation and application of these two acts that the
Superior Court bases its decision in the Pearl case.
The Act of 1887, P. L. 271, abolished the distinctions between the
different actions arising ex contractu and also those arising ex delicto and pro-
vided for one form of action for each, assumpsit and trespass. In the present
case, Keller, P. J. in his opinion said, as to the effect of the Act of 1887,
"Any civil wrong, delict or tort, whether or not it could have been included
with the former action of trespass, trover or trespass on the case is made
remediable by the Act of 1887 in an action of 'trespass' ."
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By the Act of 1917, P. L. 241, it was a misdemeanor to withhold or
convert funds received and held for another and belonging to another. Of this
act the Court said, "Commonly known as fraudulent conversion, it is not con-
fined to cases of conversion following a supposititious finding, or trover, and
hence, is not limited to cases where the duty rested on the defendant to deliver
to the owner the identical property, coin, bank notes etc., which he received."
On the basis of these statutes, the Court reasoned that the act of the
defendant was a public wrong and being such, it was also a civil wrong, tort
or delict against the plaintiff, whose particular interest was designed to be
protected by the Act of 1917. And being a tort or delict under the Act of
1887, damages could be recovered in an action of "trespass". In so concluding,
the Court expressly overruled the Paller case.
In the final analysis, the decision of the court amounts to a recognition
of the substantive rights of the parties rather than jan adherence to any pro-
cedural technicality. And this is rightly so. Whether a party is entitled to
judicial relief should not depend upon the form of the action brought, but
whether in substantive law he is wronged and deserving of recovery. It would
entirely defeat the purpose of the Court's position as an administrator of
justice, if a wrongdoer were protected simply because there was no technical
action available to the person clearly wronged, or the improper form of action
was brought. Our conception of morals and social justice will not permit the
wrongdoer to go unpunished and hide behind "technical apron strings".
This concept has been incorporated in Recommendation 15 of the Pro-
cedural Rules Committee. Rule 3001 entitled "Civil Action for Damages"
provides, "(a) Actions formerly brought in assumpsit or trespass shall here-
after be brought in a single form of action at law to be called a 'civil action
for damages'." The purpose of this rule is not to alter the substantive rights
and liabilities of parties but it is apparently to do away with an injustice that
may arise from errors or omissions in form, as well as to provide a uniform
system for civil actions. In the April, 1943 issue of the Pennsylvania Bar
Association Quarterly, the Hon. Charles E. Kenworthey, a member of the
Procedural Rules Committee, stated, ". . . the object of the tentative draft is
to provide a uniform system for 'any civil action or proceeding at law or in
equity' which includes ejectment, replevin, mandamus, quo warranto, etc. which
are now dealt with separately."
Whether or not the rule proposed by the Committee includes all actions
as stated by Judge Kenworthey is not shown by the language of the rule. And,
whether or not the rule should be so extended is not to be discussed here.
What is significant is the move to place less emphasis upon the form of action
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and to give a greater consideration to the substantive rights of the parties.
Thus, the adoption of the proposed rule will eliminate such problems as that
involved in the Pearl case and the merits of the case will be the primary basis
of recovery.
S. S. M.
